Federal Prisoners and the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA)

The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) is the primary vehicle through which federal prisoners can sue the United States government for negligent or wrongful acts committed by federal employees. In the context of federal prisoners, claims under the FTCA can commonly include medical malpractice or negligence. This blog post will discuss the complicated history federal prisoners have had with FTCA claims and how a recent Supreme Court of the United States (SCOTUS) decision has catalyzed the narrowing of avenues federal prisoners can take to pursue remedy for wrongful acts committed by federal employees.

Troublesome Start to Solutions

In 1946, when Congress passed the FTCA as part of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, it was primarily concerned with resolving a massive backlog of private bills and private citizen matters. While creating the FTCA, very little attention was paid to prisoner rights. The FTCA waived sovereign immunity broadly for negligent or wrongful acts committed by federal employees acting within the scope of their employment, but the FTCA was silent on its interaction between federally categorized individuals, namely federal prisoners and federal employees in prisons.

In the years following the passage of the FTCA, the federal government resisted claims arising from federal prisoners. The government’s reason for denying FTCA claims related to federal prisoners started with the idea that federal prisoners had a remedy through the Bureau of Prisons, an internal administrative institution aimed at resolving tort claims in federal prisons. Additionally, in 1950, SCOTUS issued its ruling in Feres v. United States, which restricted the scope of the FTCA.

In short, the Feres decision in 1950 established that the FTCA did not waive sovereign immunity for injuries to service members. The court ruled that the relationship between the federal government and its armed forces is "distinctly federal in character"—unlike the relationship between the government and a civilian. The FTCA conditions liability on whether a private person would be liable under state law in similar circumstances, but there is no private analog to the military.

While not stated in the Feres decision, the court's ruling in Feres inadvertently extended to federal prisoners simply due to the "distinctly federal in character” assertion made in the decision. When comparing federal prisoners and military personnel, both groups have a similar relationship with the federal government: both are required to follow orders, both are restricted by institutional authority, both lack a private analogy. For this reason, the rationale behind the Feres decision extended to federal prisoners. It was not until 1963 that federal prisoners received explicit clarification on their ability to submit FTCA claims. 

Providing the Tools for Remedy

In 1963, SCOTUS issued its ruling in United States v. Muniz. Contrary to earlier decisions, the Muniz decision directly answered whether federal prisoners' claims were implicitly excluded from FTCA claims and whether federal prisoners should be viewed under the Feres guidelines. In short, the court rejected the government’s claim that federal prisoners should be categorized as military personnel under the Feres guideline and instead stated that federal prisoners were allowed to bring claims under the FTCA. The Muniz decision was significant not just for what it held but also for what it refused to do. SCOTUS explicitly distinguished federal prisoners from soldiers, noting that the military's unique constitutional status and the specific federal compensation schemes available to service members would not be extended to federal prisoners.

Post Muniz, the integration and extension of FTCA claims to federal prisoners came slowly. In 1971, SCOTUS heard Bivens v. Six Unnamed Unknown Agents. The Bivens decision inferred a private right to action for individuals whose constitutional rights had been violated by federal officials. In relation to federal prisoners, the Bivens decision allowed federal prisoners to pursue claims against individual federal officials who violated their constitutional rights. In 1980, SCOTUS issued its ruling in Carlson v. Green, which established that a Bivens action does not exclude an FTCA claim; both claims can exist simultaneously and complementarily. Over time federal prisoners were slowly granted the tools to effectively bring claims against federal officials, federal healthcare providers, and the government. However, the tools established in Bivens have slowly been dismantled.

Packing up the Tools

It would be unreasonable to assert that contempt toward the Bivens decision is a new phenomenon. Dissenting opinions in the Bivens outline initial criticism in the majority opinion's decision. Criticism did not come from a place of disdain for the substance of the decision, but rather the legal and institutional implications it would have. Dissenting opinions in Bivens outline that the court's decision increased the federal court's burden to resolve claims, thereby increasing reliance on the court. More importantly, dissenters in Bivens expressed that the decision was a blatant disregard toward the separation of powers because Congress should be creating remedy, not the courts. Such dissenting language from the outset is typically a good indicator that a case will be reevaluated at a later time; Bivens does not deviate from that trend.

In 2022, SCOTUS heard and decided in Egbert v. Boule. In short, the majority opinion of the case ruled that only Congress could authorize a damage remedy for asserted First or Fourth Amendment violations for cases against federal agents, not the courts. Moreover, the majority opinion cautioned courts to limit the opinions in which judgment extends beyond the scope outlined in Bivens. While Bivens was not overruled, the scope of the Bivens decision was curtailed.

On the surface, the Egbert decision does not directly discuss federal prisoners; however, the implications of limiting review to the confined guidelines established in Bivens are substantial. Because Egbert makes it difficult to bring a Bivens claim, federal prisoners who suffer harm at the hands of federal employees have only two realistic options: the FTCA (against the government) or nothing.

For prisoners and their attorneys today, the post-Egbert landscape means the FTCA is usually the first and only viable avenue for remedy. The strategic reality is that the FTCA bears more weight than it was ever designed to carry, and its structural limitations—no punitive damages, no jury, no reach over contractors, no remedy for intentional torts—mean that weight is often too much for justice to be fully served, something the Bivens avenue was able to partially address.

References

Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971)

Egbert v. Boule, 596 U.S. ___ (2022)

Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950)

United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150 (1963)